Gun Safety in the Age of Kavanaugh by Hartunian, Joseph S.
Michigan Law Review Online 
Volume 117 Article 8 
2019 
Gun Safety in the Age of Kavanaugh 
Joseph S. Hartunian 
Proskauer Rose LLP 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_online 
 Part of the Second Amendment Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, and the 
Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joseph S. Hartunian, Gun Safety in the Age of Kavanaugh, 117 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 104 (2019). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_online/vol117/iss1/8 
 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan 
Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review Online by an 









ond	Amendment	 to	 the	United	 States	 Constitution,	which	 provides:	 “A	
well-regulated	Militia,	being	necessary	to	the	security	of	a	free	State,	the	
right	of	the	people	to	keep	and	bear	Arms,	shall	not	be	infringed.”1	In	the	
landmark	 case	District	 of	 Columbia	 v.	 Heller	 (Heller	 I),	 Justice	 Antonin	
Scalia	wrote	the	majority	opinion,	holding	that	this	amendment	“guaran-
tee[s]	the	individual	right	to	possess	and	carry	weapons	in	case	of	con-
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regulations	adopted	by	the	District	in	the	wake	of	Heller	I.6	On	appeal	to	
the	 Court	 of	 Appeals	 for	 the	 District	 of	 Columbia	 Circuit,	 then–Circuit	
Judge	 Brett	 Kavanaugh	 filed	 a	 dissenting	 opinion	 arguing	 that	 the	
measures	 taken	 by	 the	 District	 remained	 unconstitutional,	 applying	 a	
unique	“history	and	tradition”	based	test	that	differs	from	the	standards	




likely	 come	 to	 be	 clarified	 during	 his	 tenure—and	possibly	as	 soon	 as	
later	 this	 term.	 This	 Essay	 takes	 stock	 of	 the	 different	 approaches	
adopted	and	advocated	for	in	evaluating	constitutional	challenges	in	Sec-
ond	Amendment	opinions	throughout	the	country.	The	author’s	hope	is	


















schools	 and	 government	 buildings,	 or	 laws	 imposing	 conditions	 and	
qualifications	on	the	commercial	sale	of	arms.9	
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trict	 of	 Columbia	 law	 challenged	 by	 Dick	 Heller	 that	 prevented	 D.C.	
residents	 from	carrying	useable	 firearms	 in	 the	home	was	unconstitu-
tional.	
By	holding	the	District	of	Columbia	restriction	to	be	unconstitutional,	
Justice	 Scalia	 explicitly	 rejected	 evaluating	 Second	 Amendment	 chal-
lenges	 under	 “rational	 basis	 scrutiny.”13	 Occasionally,	 constitutional	
rights	 of	 individuals	 are	 analyzed	 under	 this	 so-called	 “rational	 basis	
test,”	which	requires	a	statute’s	disparate	treatment	to	bear	a	rational	re-












years	 as	 a	 reaction	 to	 widespread	 school	 shootings	 and	 gun	 violence	
across	 the	 country,	 as	 officials	 attempt	 to	 find	a	way	 to	 stem	 the	 vio-
lence.19	Because	of	 this,	 Justice	Breyer	argued,	application	of	 the	strict	
scrutiny	test	will	always	 jump	to	an	analysis	of	whether	the	burden	on	
the	 individual’s	 Second	 Amendment	 rights	 outweighs	 the	 compelling	
 










	 19.	 See,	 e.g.,	Meghan	 Keneally,	How	Gun	 Laws	Have	 Changed	 in	 4	 States	 Since	 the	
Parkland	 Shooting,	 ABCNEWS	 (Mar.	 26,	 2018),	 https://abcnews.go.com/US/states-gun-
laws-changed-parkland/story?id=53902445	[https://perma.cc/F5KW-3K75].	





















approach,	 Justice	 Scalia	 criticized	 a	 test	 that	 was	 at	 least	 somewhat	





















	 27.	 Heller	v.	District	of	Columbia	 (Heller	II),	670	F.3d	1244,	1270	 (D.C.	Cir.	2011)	
(Kavanaugh,	J.,	dissenting).	

























large-capacity	magazines	 under	 intermediate	 scrutiny);	 Bonidy	v.	U.S.	Postal	 Serv.,	 790	
F.3d	1121,	1126	(10th	Cir.	2015)	(“If	Second	Amendment	rights	apply	outside	the	home,	





	 31.	 See	Tyler	v.	Hillsdale	Cty.	Sheriff’s	Dep’t	(Tyler	 II),	837	F.3d	678,	692	 (6th	Cir.	
2016)	(Boggs,	J.,	concurring)	(“The	proper	level	of	scrutiny	is	strict	scrutiny,	as	with	other	
fundamental	constitutional	rights	.	.	.	.”);	United	States	v.	Chovan,	735	F.3d	1127,	1145–46,	





level	of	 scrutiny	 required	 [for	 the	 case]	must	be	higher	 than	 [intermediate	 scrutiny].”);	













cate	 intermediate	 scrutiny.35	 This	 breakdown	 is	 similar	 to	 First	
Amendment	 jurisprudence,	 where	 content-based	 restrictions	 trigger	
strict	scrutiny,	while	more	neutral	time,	place,	or	manner	restrictions	re-
ceive	 intermediate	 scrutiny.36	 Because	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 not	 yet	
opined	on	the	standard	of	review	to	be	applied	in	any	Second	Amendment	
challenge,	 the	 “core”–“non-core”	 inquiry	 is	 secondary	 to	 the	 initial	 in-
quiry	of	exactly	what	test	to	apply.	
In	one	of	the	only	circuit	court	decisions	to	openly	adopt	strict	scru-
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One	argument	recently	advanced	 is	 that	after	McDonald,	which	de-
clared	 the	 right	 to	 own	 a	 firearm	 a	 “fundamental”	 right,	 the	 Second	
Amendment	should	be	afforded	the	same	protections	as	other	fundamen-





































	 49.	 Heller	v.	District	of	Columbia	 (Heller	II),	670	F.3d	1244,	1256	 (D.C.	Cir.	2011)	
(citations	omitted).	
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“narrowly	tailored	to	achieve	a	compelling	governmental	interest.”53	But	
it	appears	on	the	 face	of	 the	opinion	that	the	Heller	 I	majority	rejected	
that	approach	by	including	substantial	carve	outs	for	existing	regulations	
that	it	purported	not	“to	cast	doubt	on.”54	Widespread	prohibitions	on	the	
possession	 of	 firearms	 by	 the	mentally	 ill	 would	 almost	 certainly	 fail	
strict	scrutiny,	because	such	prohibitions	are	not	“narrowly	tailored.”55	
Nonetheless,	several	minority	opinions	have	essentially	argued	that	the	
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owned	by	 residents	 in	 the	District.63	The	 registration	 requirements	 in-
cluded	mandatory	ballistics	testing,64	limitations	on	the	number	of	pistols	
registered,65	 and	 renewal	 of	 the	 registration	 certificate	 every	 three	
years.66	 The	 new	 requirements	 also	 banned	 “assault	weapons,”	 as	 de-
fined	by	the	Act,	which	included	certain	brands	and	models	of	semi-auto-
matic	 firearms,	 as	 well	 as	 semi-automatic	 firearms	 that	 possessed	
specific	 features.67	Finally,	 the	Act	 also	prohibited	possession	of	maga-




plicitly	adopted	 the	same	analysis	 that	 the	Third,	Fourth,	 Seventh,	and	
Tenth	Circuits	had	already	adopted	at	that	point,	first	asking	whether	or	
not	 the	provision	falls	within	the	scope	of	 the	amendment.72	The	court	
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“longstanding”	in	light	of	multiple	state	statutes	from	the	early	twentieth	
century,	 and	 as	 such,	 presumptively	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 Second	
Amendment,	as	defined	by	Heller	I,	and	constitutional.73	But	the	majority	
found	that	 the	registration	requirements	 for	 long	guns	were	novel	and	























that	 point	 had	 already	 been	 applied	 by	 four	 other	 circuits,	 Judge	 Ka-
vanaugh	 objected.	His	 dissent	effectively	 begins	 and	ends	at	 the	 same	
point	in	Heller	I:	he	argued	that	the	majority’s	rejection	of	Justice	Breyer’s	
interest-balancing	test	foreclosed	all	the	typical	levels	of	scrutiny	evalu-
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derstanding	 of	 the	 right.86	 The	 Heller	 I	 majority	 said	 “longstanding”	
regulations	 were	 acceptable,87	 a	 limitation	 reaffirmed	 by	McDonald,88	
which	to	 Judge	Kavanaugh	meant	that	 traditional	regulations	 filled	the	
full	 scope	 of	 Second	Amendment	 limitations.89	 Kavanaugh	 argued	 that	
the	court	rejected	the	typical	range	of	scrutiny	options	because	it	never	
asked	whether	the	handgun	ban	at	 issue	 in	Heller	 I	would	have	passed	
strict	or	intermediate	scrutiny,90	and	he	instead	classified	Heller	I’s	em-










analogized	 First	 Amendment	 jurisprudence	 in	 passing,	 citing	 Turner	
Broadcasting	 to	advocate	 for	 the	general	proposition	 that	especially	 in	
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cause,	 as	 noted	 in	McDonald,	 “the	 traditions	 of	 our	 people	 [are]	para-
mount”	 and	 “long	 standing	 regulatory	 measures”	 are	 permissible,98	







threshold	 inquiry)101	and	Kavanaugh	agreed	that	 semi-automatic	 rifles	
were	 in	 common	use,	but	because	“most	of	 the	 country	 [did]	not”	ban	




doing	 so,	 he	 declined	 to	analogize,	 and	 instead	 differentiated	 between	
longstanding	record-keeping	laws	and	licensing	requirements.104	



















	 105.	 Id.	at	1274–75.	 Judge	Kavanaugh	declined	to	mention	any	specific	regulations	
other	than	those	mentioned	explicitly	in	Heller	I.	
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firearm	 is	 created,	 it	 couldn’t	 be	 regulated	 under	 this	 test,	 Judge	 Ka-






multiple	 reasons.	 If	 adopted	 by	 the	 Supreme	Court	 as	 the	appropriate	



















to	 longstanding	Fourth	Amendment	doctrine,	which	 typically	 relied	on	
the	“reasonable	expectation	of	privacy”	test	from	Katz	v.	United	States.109	








	 107.	 BRETT	 M.	 KAVANAUGH,	 S.	 COMM.	 ON	 THE	 JUDICIARY,	 PUBLIC	 QUESTIONNAIRE	 FOR	
NOMINEE	TO	THE	SUPREME	COURT	43	(2018).	
	 108.	 United	States	v.	 Jones,	625	F.3d	766	(D.C.	Cir.	2010)	(Kavanaugh,	 J.,	dissenting	








uative	 technique	 of	 constitutional	 jurisprudence	 and	 instead	 adopted	





















of	scrutiny,	 it	also	 implicitly	calls	 for	the	Court	to	clarify	 the	applicable	
Second	Amendment	analysis	for	lower	courts.	One	hopes	that	Justice	Ka-
vanaugh	recognizes	the	novelty	of	his	approach,	like	Justice	Breyer’s	in	
Heller	I,	and	the	ramifications	that	a	constitutional	ruling	on	the	merits	
could	have	on	gun	safety	for	generations	to	come.	
